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Abstract—We consider the problem of decentralized power
allocation for competitive rate-maximization in a frequency-
selective Gaussian interference channel under bounded channel
uncertainty. We formulate a distribution-free robust frame-
work for the rate-maximization game. We present the robust-
optimization equilibrium for this game and derive sufficient
conditions for its existence and uniqueness. We show that an
iterative waterfilling algorithm converges to this equilibrium un-
der certain sufficient conditions. We analyse the social properties
of the equilibrium under varying channel uncertainty bounds for
the two-user case. We also observe an interesting phenomenon
that the equilibrium moves towards a frequency-division multiple
access solution for any set of channel coefficients under increasing
channel uncertainty bounds. We further prove that increasing
channel uncertainty can lead to a more efficient equilibrium,
and hence, a better sum rate in certain two-user communication
systems. Finally, we confirm, through simulations, this improve-
ment in equilibrium efficiency is also observed in systems with
a higher number of users.
Index Terms—Game theory, rate-maximization, Nash equilib-
rium, waterfilling, CSI uncertainty, robust games.
I. INTRODUCTION
Rate-maximization is an important signal processing prob-
lem for power-constrained multi-user wireless systems. It
involves solving a power control problem for mutually in-
terfering users operating across multiple frequencies in a
Gaussian interference channel. In modern wireless systems
where users may enter or leave the system freely and make
decisions independently, decentralized control approaches and
distributed algorithms are necessary. Game-theoretic methods
provide an appropriate set of tools for the design of such
algorithms and have been increasingly used for the analysis
and study of communications problems [3].
In multi-user systems, the users can either cooperate with
each other to achieve a socially optimal solution or compete
against one another to optimize their own selfish objectives.
Cooperative game-theoretic approaches to the problem of
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power control in wireless networks have been investigated in
[4], [5] and surveyed in [6]–[8]. In this paper, we are interested
in the other scenario where the users are competing against one
another and aiming to maximize their own information rates.
This competitive rate-maximization problem can be modelled
as a strategic noncooperative game. The Nash equilibrium [9]
of this game can be achieved via a distributed waterfilling
algorithm where each user performs waterfilling by consider-
ing the multi-user interference as an additive coloured noise.
However, most of the current results on rate-maximization
and waterfilling algorithms assume the availability of perfect
information which is a strong requirement and cannot be met
by practical systems.
This paper addresses the following fundamental questions:
i) How can the users independently allocate power if the
channel state information (CSI) they have is imperfect? How
can we formulate a rate maximization game under channel
uncertainty and what is the nature of the equilibrium of this
game? ii) What are the existence and uniqueness properties of
such an equilibrium? How can such a solution be computed
by a distributed algorithm and what are the conditions for
asymptotic convergence of such an algorithm? iii) How are
these conditions affected by the channel uncertainty? iv) What
is the effect of uncertainty on the sum-rate and the price
of anarchy of such a system? In answering these questions,
we can gain further insight into the behaviour of waterfilling
algorithms and methods to improve sum-rate in general.
A. Summary of Main Results
The main contributions of this paper are three-fold. First, we
provide a game-theoretic solution for the problem of competi-
tive rate-maximization in the presence of channel uncertainty.
Secondly, we analyse the efficiency of the equilibrium as
a function of the channel uncertainty bound and prove that
the robust waterfilling solution proposed achieves a higher
sum-rate with increasing uncertainty under certain conditions.
Finally, we verify these results via simulations. We show that
improved sum-rate under channel uncertainty entails a cost in
terms of more stringent conditions for the uniqueness of the
equilibrium and slower convergence of the iterative algorithm
to the equilibrium.
For systems with bounded channel uncertainty, we present
a distribution-free robust formulation of the rate-maximization
game based on an ellipsoid approximation of the uncertainty in
the CSI. We present the robust-optimization equilibrium (RE)
for this game. At the equilibrium, the users perform a modified
2waterfilling operation where frequency-overlap among users
is penalized. We derive sufficient conditions for the existence
and uniqueness of the equilibrium and for the convergence
of an asynchronous iterative waterfilling algorithm to the
equilibrium of this game.
In our work, we investigate the effect of channel uncertainty
on the sum-rate of the system for the two-user case under two
scenarios, viz., a two-frequency system and a system with
large number of frequencies. For the two-frequency system,
the equilibrium sum-rate improves and the price of anarchy
decreases as the channel uncertainty increases under high
interference. On the other hand, the behavior is reversed at
low interference. Another important contribution of our work
is to show that increasing channel uncertainty always drives
the equilibrium closer to a frequency division multiple access
(FDMA) solution for any set of channel coefficients for the
system with asymptotic number of frequencies. This is because
the users become more conservative about causing interference
under increased uncertainty and this leads to better partitioning
of the frequencies among the users. Under certain channel
conditions, this also translates to an improvement in the sum-
rate and a decrease in the price of anarchy of the system. Thus,
we show an interesting phenomenon where increased channel
uncertainty can lead to a more efficient equilibrium, and hence,
a better sum-rate in certain multi-user communication systems.
B. Related Work
An iterative waterfilling algorithm for maximizing infor-
mation rates in digital subscriber line systems [10] is an
early application of a game-theoretic approach to designing a
decentralized algorithm for multi-user dynamic power control.
This framework has been further analyzed and extended in
[11]–[15]. The inefficiency of the Nash equilibrium (which
need not be Pareto optimal) has been addressed in [16] and
[17] and methods to improve the sum-rate of the system by
using various pricing schemes and modified utility functions
have been presented in [15], [18], [19]. A centralized controller
maximizing the sum-rate of the system leads to a non-convex
optimization problem and has been shown to be strongly NP–
hard in [20]. The Pareto-optimality of the FDMA solution
for this sum-rate maximization problem under certain channel
conditions has been proved in [21].
Uncertainty in game theory and distributed optimization
problems has only recently been investigated. The issue of
bounded uncertainty in specific distributed optimization prob-
lems in communication networks has been investigated in [22]
wherein techniques to define the uncertainty set such that they
can be solved distributively by robust optimization techniques
are presented. In [23], incomplete-information finite games
have been modelled as a distribution-free robust game where
the players use a robust optimization approach to counter
bounded payoff uncertainty. This robust game model also
introduced a distribution-free equilibrium concept called the
robust-optimization equilibrium on which our approach is
based.
A brief look at a robust optimization approach for the
rate-maximization game with uncertainty in the noise-plus-
interference estimate has been presented in [24], where the
authors present a numerically computed algorithm unlike the
closed form results presented here. Such a numerical solution
prevents further mathematical analysis of the equilibrium and
its behaviour under different uncertainty bounds. Also, this
uncertainty model is different from ours, where we assume
the availability of CSI of the interfering channels and that
these quantities have a bounded uncertainty.
A similar problem of rate-maximization in the presence
of uncertainty in the estimate of noise-plus-interference lev-
els due to quantization in the feedback channel has been
considered in [25]. This problem has been solved using a
probabilistically constrained optimization approach and as in
our work, also results in the waterfilling solution moving closer
to an FDMA solution, with corresponding improvement in
sum-rate. However, the effect of quantization on the conditions
for existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium and conver-
gence of the algorithm have not been considered. The results
presented in [25] are for a sequentially updated algorithm
whereas our results allow asynchronous (and thus sequential
or simultaneous) updates to the algorithm. Also, the power
allocations computed by such a probabilistic optimization for-
mulation do not guarantee that the information rates expected
will be achieved for all channel realizations, unlike our worst-
case optimization formulation. Furthermore, the relative error
(and not just the absolute error due to quantization) in the
interference estimate as defined in [25] is assumed to be
bounded and drawn from a uniform distribution, which is
inaccurate. In addition, this bound on the relative error can
only be computed if the noise variance at the receivers is
assumed to be known (which is not the case). The bounds
computed in such a fashion are very loose and will degrade
system performance. The other assumption that this relative
error bound is in the range [0, 1) means that the absolute
quantization error has to be less than the noise variance at the
receivers, which restricts the applicability of the approach. Our
problem formulation has no such limitation on the uncertainty
bound based on the noise variances in the system.
Robust rate-maximization for a cognitive radio scenario
with uncertainty in the channel to the primary user has
been presented in [26]. This leads to a noncooperative game
formulation without any uncertainties in the payoff functions
of the game (unlike in our case) with robust interference limits
acting as a constraint on the admissible set of strategies. This
game is then solved by numerical optimization as there is no
closed form solution.
Initial results of our work, involving the problem formu-
lation of the robust rate-maximization game and the results
for sufficient conditions for existence and uniqueness of the
equilibrium, along with the conditions for asymptotic conver-
gence of the waterfilling algorithm to the equilibrium, have
been presented in [1]. Initial results on the analysis of the
efficiency of the equilibrium was presented in [2]. We now
extend this work to include detailed proofs and further analysis
of the efficiency of the equilibrium as a function of the channel
uncertainty bound.
3C. Paper Outline
This paper is organized as follows: Section II describes
the system model and provides the necessary preliminaries.
Section III formulates the robust game model for the rate-
maximization game for the single-input single-output (SISO)
frequency-selective Gaussian interference channel. Section IV
presents the robust-optimization equilibrium for this game
and conditions for its existence and uniqueness, along with
the conditions for asymptotic convergence of the waterfilling
algorithm to the equilibrium. Section V presents the analysis
on the effect of uncertainty on the sum-rate of the system for
the two-user scenario. Section VI presents simulation results
and Section VII presents the conclusions from this work and
possible future research directions.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PRELIMINARIES
Notations used: Vectors and matrices are denoted by lower-
case and uppercase boldface letters respectively. The operators
(·)T , (·)−T ,E{·} and ‖ · ‖2 are respectively transpose, trans-
pose of matrix inverse, statistical expectation and Euclidean
norm operators. The diagonal matrix with the arguments as
diagonal elements is denoted by Diag(·). The quantity [A]ij
refers to the (i, j)-th element of A. Rm×n+ is the set of
m×n matrices with real non-negative elements. The spectral
radius (largest absolute eigenvalue) of matrix A is denoted
by ρ(A). The operation [x]ba is defined as [x]ba = a if x ≤
a; x if a < x < b; b if x ≥ b and (x)+ , max(0, x).
The matrix projection onto the convex set Q is denoted by
[x]Q , argminz∈Q ‖z− x‖2. The term w > 0 indicates that
all elements of w are positive and X ≻ 0 indicates that the
matrix X is positive definite.
We consider a system similar to the one in [14], which is a
SISO frequency-selective Gaussian interference channel with
N frequencies, composed of Q SISO links. Ω , {1, . . . , Q} is
the set of the Q players (i.e. SISO links). The quantity Hrq(k)
denotes the frequency response of the k-th frequency bin of
the channel between source r and destination q. The variance
of the zero-mean circularly symmetric complex Gaussian
noise at receiver q in the frequency bin k is denoted by
σ¯2q (k). The channel is assumed to be quasi-stationary for the
duration of the transmission. Let σ2q (k) , σ¯2q(k)/|Hqq(k)|2
and the total transmit power of user q be Pq . Let the vector
sq , [sq(1) sq(2) . . . sq(N)] be the N symbols transmitted by
user q on the N frequency bins and pq(k) , E{|sq(k)|2} be
the power allocated to the k-th frequency bin by user q and
pq , [pq(1) pq(2) . . . pq(N)] be the power allocation vector.
The power allocation of each user q has two constraints:
• Maximum total transmit power for each user
E
{
‖sq‖
2
2
}
=
N∑
k=1
pq(k) ≤ Pq, (1)
for q = 1, . . . , Q, where Pq is power in units of energy
per transmitted symbol.
• Spectral mask constraints
E
{
|sq(k)|
2
}
= pq(k) ≤ p
max
q (k), (2)
for k = 1, . . . , N and q = 1, . . . , Q, where pmaxq (k) is
the maximum power that is allowed to be allocated by
user q for the frequency bin k.
Each receiver estimates the channel between itself and all
the transmitters, which is private information. The power allo-
cation vectors are public information, i.e. known to all users.
Each receiver computes the optimal power allocation across
the frequency bins for its own link and transmits it back to the
corresponding transmitter in a low bit-rate error-free feedback
channel. Note that this leads to sharing of more information
compared to other works in literature such as [14]. The channel
state information estimated by each receiver is assumed to
have a bounded uncertainty of unknown distribution. Ellipsoid
is often used to approximate unknown and potentially com-
plicated uncertainty sets [27]. The ellipsoidal approximation
has the advantage of parametrically modelling complicated
data sets and thus provides a convenient input parameter
to algorithms. Further, in certain cases, there are statistical
reasons leading to ellipsoidal uncertainty sets and also results
in optimization problems with convenient analytical structures
[28], [29].
We consider that at each frequency, the uncertainty in the
channel state information of each user is deterministically
modelled under an ellipsoidal approximation1
Fq =
{
Frq(k) + ∆Frq,k :
∑
r 6=q
|∆Frq,k|
2 ≤ ǫ2q
∀k = 1, . . . , N
}
,
(3)
where ǫq ≥ 0 ∀ q ∈ Ω is the uncertainty bound and
Frq(k) ,
|Hrq(k)|2
|Hqq(k)|2
, (4)
with Frq(k) being the nominal value. We can consider un-
certainty in Frq(k) instead of Hrq(k) because a bounded
uncertainty in Frq(k) and Hrq(k) are equivalent, but with
different bounds.2
The information rate of user q can be written as [30]
Rq =
N∑
k=1
log
(
1 +
pq(k)
σ2q(k) +
∑
r 6=q Frq(k)pr(k)
)
, (5)
where σ2q(k) , σ¯2q (k)/|Hqq(k)|2. The two popular measures
of “inefficiency” of the equilibria of a game are the price of
anarchy and the price of stability. The price of anarchy is
defined as the ratio between the objective function value at
the socially optimal solution and the worst objective function
value at any equilibrium of the game [31]. The price of
stability is defined as the ratio between the objective function
value at the socially optimal solution and the best objective
function value at any equilibrium of the game [31]. We
consider the sum-rate of the system as the social objective
1More specifically, we have a spherical approximation in (3).
2The model considered here has some redundancy in the uncertainty for
the case when Frq(k) = 0 which leads to including Frq(k) +∆Frq,k < 0
in the model which can never happen in practice. However, this does not
affect the solution in our method due to the nature of the max-min problem
formulation in (11) which leads to selection of positive values of ∆Frq,k .
4function. The sum-rate of the system is given by
S =
Q∑
q=1
Rq. (6)
In our case, the price of stability and anarchy are the same
as we prove the sufficient conditions for the existence of a
unique equilibrium in Theorem 1. Thus, the price of anarchy,
PoA, is the ratio of the sum-rate of the system at the social
optimal solution, S∗, and the sum-rate of the system at the
robust-optimization equilibrium, Srob, i.e.,
PoA =
S∗
Srob
. (7)
Note that a lower price of anarchy indicates that the equilib-
rium is more efficient.
III. ROBUST RATE-MAXIMIZATION GAME FORMULATION
A. Nominal Game - No Channel Uncertainty
The problem of power allocation across the frequency bins
is cast as a strategic noncooperative game with the SISO links
as players and their information rates as pay-off functions [14].
Mathematically, the nominal game G nom can be written as,
∀q ∈ Ω,
max
pq
N∑
k=1
log
(
1 +
pq(k)
σ2q (k) +
∑
r 6=q
Frq(k)pr(k)
)
s. t. pq ∈ Pq,
(8)
where Ω , {1, . . . , Q} is the set of the Q players (i.e. the
SISO links) and Pq is the set of admissible strategies of user
q, which is defined as
Pq ,
{
pq ∈ R
N : 0 ≤ pq(k) ≤ p
max
q (k),
N∑
k=1
pq(k) = Pq, k = 1, . . . , N
}
.
(9)
The inequality constraint in (1) is replaced with the equality
constraint in (9) as, at the optimum of each problem in (8),
the constraint must be satisfied with equality [14]. To avoid
the trivial solution pq(k) = pmaxq (k) ∀k, it is assumed that∑N
k=1 p
max
q > Pq . Further, the players can be limited to pure
strategies instead of mixed strategies, as shown in [17].
B. Robust Game - With Channel Uncertainty
According to the robust game model [23], each player
formulates a best response as the solution of a robust (worst-
case) optimization problem for the uncertainty in the payoff
function (information rate), given the other players’ strategies.
If all the players know that everyone else is using the robust
optimization approach to the payoff uncertainty, they would
then be able to mutually predict each other’s behaviour. The
robust game G rob where each player q formulates a worst-case
robust optimization problem can be written as, ∀ q ∈ Ω,
max
pq
min
F˜rq∈Fq
N∑
k=1
log
(
1 +
pq(k)
σ2q (k) +
∑
r 6=q
F˜rq(k)pr(k)
)
s. t. pq ∈ Pq,
(10)
where Fq is the uncertainty set which is modelled under
ellipsoid approximation as shown in (3). This optimization
problem using uncertainty sets can be equivalently written in
a form represented by protection functions [22] as, ∀q ∈ Ω,
max
pq
min
∆Frq,k
N∑
k=1
log
(
1+
pq(k)
σ2q (k)+
∑
r 6=q
(Frq(k)+∆Frq,k)pr(k)
)
s. t.
∑
r 6=q
|∆Frq,k|
2 ≤ ǫ2q, pq ∈ Pq. (11)
From the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality [32], we get∑
r 6=q
∆Frq,kpr(k) ≤
[∑
r 6=q
|∆Frq,k|
2
∑
r 6=q
|pr(k)|
2
] 1
2
≤ ǫq
√∑
r 6=q p
2
r(k)
(12)
Using (12), we get the robust game G rob as, ∀q ∈ Ω,
max
pq
N∑
k=1
log
(
1+
pq(k)
σ2q (k) +
∑
r 6=q
Frq(k)pr(k)+ ǫq
√∑
r 6=q
p2r(k)
)
s. t. pq ∈ Pq. (13)
Now that we have defined the problem for robust rate-
maximization under bounded channel uncertainty, we present
the solution to the optimization problem in (13) for a single-
user in the following section.
C. Robust Waterfilling Solution
The closed-form solution to the robust optimization problem
in (13) for any particular user q is given by the following
theorem:
Lemma 1. Given the set of power allocations of other users
p−q , {p1, . . . ,pq−1,pq+1, . . . ,pQ}, the solution to
max
pq
N∑
k=1
log
(
1+
pq(k)
σ2q (k) +
∑
r 6=q
Frq(k)pr(k)+ ǫq
√∑
r 6=q
p2r(k)
)
s. t. pq ∈ Pq. (14)
is given by the waterfilling solution
p⋆q = RWFq(p−q), (15)
where the waterfilling operator RWFq(·) is defined as[
RWFq(p−q)
]
k
,[
µq−σ
2
q(k)−
∑
r 6=q
Frq(k)pr(k)−ǫq
√∑
r 6=q
p2r(k)
]pmaxq (k)
0
(16)
5for k = 1, . . . , N, where µq is chosen to satisfy the power
constraint
∑N
k=1 p
⋆
q(k) = Pq .
Proof: This can be shown using the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker
optimality conditions [27] of this problem.
The robust waterfilling operation for each user is a dis-
tributed worst-case optimization under bounded channel un-
certainty. Compared with the original waterfilling operation in
[14] under perfect CSI (i.e. ǫq ≡ 0), we see that an additional
term has appeared in (16) for ǫq > 0. This additional term can
be interpreted as a penalty for allocating power to frequencies
having a large product of uncertainty bound and norm of the
powers of the other players currently transmitting in those
frequencies. This is because the users assume the worst-case
interference from other users and are thus conservative about
allocating power to such channels where there is a strong
presence of other users.
Having derived the robust waterfilling solution for a single
user in the presence of channel uncertainty, we consider
whether a stable equilibrium for the system exists and if so,
what its properties are and how it can be computed in the
multi-user scenario in the following section.
IV. ROBUST-OPTIMIZATION EQUILIBRIUM
The solution to the game G rob is the robust-optimization
equilibrium (RE). At any robust-optimization equilibrium of
this game, the optimum action profile of the players {p⋆q}q∈Ω
must satisfy the following set of simultaneous waterfilling
equations: ∀q ∈ Ω,
p⋆q = RWFq(p
⋆
1, . . . ,p
⋆
q−1,p
⋆
q+1, . . . ,p
⋆
Q) = RWFq(p
⋆
−q).
(17)
It can easily be verified that the RE reduces to the Nash
equilibrium of the system [14] when there is no uncertainty in
the system. In Section V, we analyse the global efficiency of
the RE and show that the RE has a higher efficiency than the
Nash equilibrium due to a penalty for interference which en-
courages better partitioning of the frequency space among the
users. The robust asynchronous iterative waterfilling algorithm
for computing the RE of game G rob in a distributed fashion
is described in Algorithm 1.
A. Analysis of the RE of Game G rob
Let N = {1, . . . , N} be the set of frequency bins. Let D◦q
denote the set of frequency bins that user q would never use
as the best response to any set of strategies adopted by the
other users,
D◦q ,
{
k ∈ {1, . . . , N} :[
RWFq(p−q)
]
k
= 0 ∀p−q ∈ P−q
}
,
(18)
where P−q , P1 × · · · × Pq−1 ×Pq+1 × · · · × PQ. The non-
negative matrices E and Smax ∈ RQ×Q+ are defined as
[E]qr ,
{
ǫq, if r 6= q,
0, otherwise,
(19)
Algorithm 1 – Robust Iterative Waterfilling Algorithm
Input:
Ω: Set of users in the system
Pq: Set of admissible strategies of user q
Tq: Set of time instants n when the power vector p(n)q of
user q is updated
T : Number of iterations for which the algorithm is run
τqr (n): Time of the most recent power allocation of user r
available to user q at time n
RWFq(·): Robust waterfilling operation in (16)
Initialization: n = 0 and p(0)q ← any p ∈ Pq, ∀q ∈ Ω
for n = 0 to T do
p
(n+1)
q =
{
RWFq
(
p
(τq(n))
−q
)
, if n ∈ Tq,
p(n)q , otherwise,
∀q ∈ Ω.
end for
and
[Smax]qr ,
{
max
k∈Dq∩Dr
Frq(k), if r 6= q,
0, otherwise,
(20)
where Dq is any subset of {1, . . . , N} such that N −D◦q ⊆
Dq ⊆ {1, . . . , N}.
The sufficient condition for existence and uniqueness of
the RE of game G rob and for the guaranteed convergence of
Algorithm 1 is given by the following theorem:
Theorem 1. Game G rob has at least one equilibrium for
any set of channel values and transmit powers of the users.
Furthermore, the equilibrium is unique and the asynchronous
iterative waterfilling algorithm described in Algorithm 1 con-
verges to the unique RE of game G rob as the number of
iterations for which the algorithm is run, T → ∞ for any
set of feasible initial conditions if
ρ(Smax) < 1− ρ(E), (21)
where E and S are as defined in (19) and (20) respectively.
Proof: See Appendix C.
In the absence of uncertainty, i.e. when ǫq = 0 ∀q ∈ Ω,
we can see that this condition reduces to condition (C1) in
[14] as expected. Since ρ(E) ≥ 0, the condition on Smax
becomes more stringent as the uncertainty bound increases,
i.e. the set of channel coefficients for which the existence of
a unique equilibrium and the convergence of the algorithm is
guaranteed shrinks as the uncertainty bound increases. Also,
from Lemma 3, we can see that the modulus of the waterfilling
contraction increases as uncertainty increases. This indicates
that the convergence of the iterative waterfilling algorithm
becomes slower as the uncertainty increases, as shown in
simulation results.
Corollary 1. When the uncertainties of all the Q users
are equal (say ǫ), the RE of the game G rob is unique and
Algorithm 1 converges to the unique RE of game G rob as
T →∞ for any set of feasible initial condition if
ρ(Smax) < 1− ǫ(Q− 1) (22)
6Proof: When the uncertainties of all Q users is ǫ, we get
ρ(E) = ǫ(Q− 1).
The above corollary explicitly shows how the uncertainty
bound and the number of users in the system affect the
existence of the equilibrium and the convergence to the
equilibrium using an iterative waterfilling algorithm. For a
fixed uncertainty bound, as the number of users in the system
increases, there is a larger amount of uncertain information
in the system. Hence, the probability that a given system for
a fixed uncertainty bound will converge will decrease as the
number of users in the system increases. Also, if ǫ(Q−1) ≥ 1,
we will not have a guaranteed unique equilibrium and algorith-
mic convergence for non-zero uncertainty bounds regardless of
the channel coefficients. This will help designers plan for the
appropriate uncertainty bounds based on the planned number
of users in the system.
V. EFFICIENCY AT THE EQUILIBRIUM – TWO-USER CASE
In this section, we analyse the effect of uncertainty on the
social output of the system. For the two user case, the worst-
case interference in each frequency reduces to
(
Frq(k) +
ǫq
)
pr(k) with q, r = 1, 2 and q 6= r. This means that the
robust waterfilling operation for the two user case (Q = 2) is
simply the standard waterfilling solution with the worst-case
channel coefficients. We restrict the analysis to the two-user
case with identical noise variance σ2q (k) = σ2 ∀k, q across
all frequencies and identical uncertainty bounds ǫ1 = ǫ2 = ǫ
and total power constraints
∑N
k=1 p1(k) =
∑N
k=1 p2(k) = PT
for both users. These results can be extended to the non-
identical case along similar lines. In order to develop a clear
understanding of the behaviour of the equilibrium, the sum-
rate of the system is first analyzed for a system with two
frequencies (N = 2) and then extended to systems with large
(N →∞) number of frequencies.
A. Two Frequency Case (N = 2)
Consider a two-frequency anti-symmetric system as shown
in Figure 1 where the channel gains are |H11(1)|2 =
|H11(2)|2 = |H22(1)|2 = |H22(2)|2 = 1; |H12(2)|2 =
|H21(1)|2 = α and |H12(1)|2 = |H21(2)|2 = mα with m > 1
and 0 < α < 1. From (16) the power allocations at the robust-
optimization equilibrium of this system are,
p1(1) = [µ1 − σ
2 − (α+ ǫ)p2(1)]
+,
p1(2) = [µ1 − σ
2 − (mα+ ǫ)p2(2)]
+,
p2(1) = [µ2 − σ
2 − (mα+ ǫ)p1(1)]
+,
p2(2) = [µ2 − σ
2 − (α+ ǫ)p1(2)]
+,
(23)
and the total power constraint for each user is p1(1)+p1(2) =
p2(1) + p2(2) = 1. Let p1(1) = p, hence, by symmetry,
p1(2) = p2(1) = 1− p, p2(2) = p and µ1 = µ2 = µ.
The following theorem presents the effect of uncertainty on
the sum-rate and price of anarchy of the system for the high
interference and low interference cases.
Theorem 2. For the two-user two-frequency anti-symmetric
system described above, we have the following results:
PSfrag replacements
Tx 1
Tx 2
Rx 1
Rx 2
[α,mα]
[mα, α]
[1,1]
[1,1]
Fig. 1: Anti-symmetric system with Q = 2, N = 2, ǫ1 = ǫ2 =
ǫ and the noise variances for both users in both frequencies
is σ2. The channel gains are: |H11(1)|2 = |H11(2)|2 =
|H22(1)|2 = |H22(2)|2 = 1; |H12(2)|2 = |H21(1)|2 = α
and |H12(1)|2 = |H21(2)|2 = mα with m > 1 and
0 < α < 1. The power allocations for this system at the
robust-optimization equilibrium are presented in (23).
• High interference: When σ2 ≪ α(1 − p), the sum-rate
increases and the price of anarchy decreases as the
channel uncertainty bound increases.
• Low interference: When σ2 ≫ mαp, the sum-rate de-
creases and the price of anarchy increases as the channel
uncertainty bound increases.
Proof: See Appendix D.
We can see from this result that the RE behaves in opposite
ways when there is high interference and when there is low
interference in the system. This suggests that there might be
a certain level of interference where the sum-rate and price
of anarchy do not change with change in uncertainty. This is
given by the following proposition:
Proposition 1. At the level of interference α = αo,
where
αo =
σ2
2m
((
(m+ 1)2 +
4m
σ2
) 1
2
−m− 1
)
, (24)
the sum-rate and the price of anarchy are independent of the
level of uncertainty or the power allocation used. Furthermore,
at this value of interference, the price of anarchy is equal to
unity.
Proof: See Appendix E
We can see that even for such a simple system, the global
behaviour of the robust-optimization equilibrium appears to
be quite complex. This indicates that the global properties
of the robust-optimization equilibrium for larger systems is
quite strongly dependent on the level of interference in the
system, which is seen in the following results with asymptotic
number of frequencies. However, the underlying nature of the
algorithm for the two-frequency case is that the RE moves
towards the FDMA solution as the uncertainty bound increases
(from (63)).
B. Large Number of Frequencies (N →∞)
We consider J(k), defined as
J(k) , −p1(k)p2(k), (25)
7as a measure of the extent of partitioning of the frequency k.
It is minimum (J(k) = −1) when both the users allocate all
their total power to the same frequency k and is maximum
(J(k) = 0) when at most one user is occupying the frequency
k. Note that J(k) = 0 ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , N} when the users adopt
an FDMA scheme.
The following lemma describes the effect of the uncertainty
bound on the extent of partitioning of the system:
Lemma 2. When the number of frequencies, N → ∞, the
extent of partitioning in every frequency is non-decreasing as
the uncertainty bound of the system increases for any set of
channel values, i.e.,
∂
∂ǫ
J(k) ≥ 0 ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , N} when N →∞, (26)
with equality for frequencies where J(k) = 0, where J(k) is
defined in (25)
Proof: See Appendix F.
The above lemma suggests that the robust-optimization
equilibrium moves towards greater frequency-space partition-
ing as the uncertainty bound increases when there is a large
number of frequencies in the system. In other words, the RE is
moving closer to an FDMA solution under increased channel
uncertainty. When the FDMA solution is globally optimal,
this will lead to an improvement in the performance of the
equilibrium. This is stated in the following theorem:
Theorem 3. As the number of frequencies, N →∞, the sum-
rate (price of anarchy) at the robust-optimization equilibrium
of the system is non-decreasing (non-increasing) as the uncer-
tainty bound increases if, ∀ k ∈ {1, . . . , N},
(F21(k)− ǫ)(F12(k)− ǫ) >
1
4
. (27)
Proof: Using [21, Corollary 3.1], we find that the sum of
the rates of the two users in the frequency k is quasi-convex
only if F21(k)F12(k) > 1/4. Let C be the minimum number
of frequencies occupied by any user. When there are only
two users and a large number of frequencies, C ≫ 1. If the
condition F21(k)F12(k) > 14 (1 +
1
C−1 )
2 is satisfied for some
C ≥ 2 for all frequencies k ∈ {1, . . . , N} (thus satisfying
F21(k)F12(k) > 1/4), then the Pareto optimal solution is
FDMA [21, Theorem 3.3]. This needs to be satisfied for the
worst-case channel coefficients which leads to (27). Thus, the
solution moving closer to FDMA will improve the sum-rate
of the system. From Lemma 2, the robust equilibrium moves
closer to FDMA as uncertainty increases and thus will result
in an improvement in sum-rate.
The Pareto optimal solution under this condition (which
is FDMA) is constant under varying uncertainty bounds as
such an uncertainty in the interference coefficients F12(k) and
F21(k) does not affect the FDMA solution where there is no
interference. Thus, an increase in sum-rate will result in an
decrease in price of anarchy.
Remark 1. For the special case of frequency-flat systems, at
the equilibrium, all users have equal power allocation to all
frequencies and this is not dependent on the uncertainty in
the CSI. This leads to no change in the extent of partitioning
and thus sum-rate and price of anarchy are not affected by
uncertainty.
Remark 2. The results of this section are not just limited to the
robust-optimization equilibrium for the system presented here.
When the uncertainty ǫ = 0, the framework presented here can
be used to analyse the behaviour of the Nash equilibrium of the
iterative waterfilling algorithm as a function of the interference
coefficients.
Remark 3. The modified waterfilling operation in (16) can also
be used as a pricing mechanism to achieve improved sum-rate
performance in a system with no uncertainty where ǫ is a
design parameter, with all the analytical results presented here
still being valid.
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we present some simulation results to study
the impact of channel uncertainty on the RE by comparing
it with the ideal scenario of NE under perfect CSI. Figure 2
shows the simulation results for the two user and two fre-
quency scenario and Figures 3–10 show the results for a more
general system under different settings.
In Figure 2a, we can see the sum-rate at high interference
as a function of interference and uncertainty in the system
shown in Figure 1. The flat region corresponds to the sum-
rate at Pareto optimal solution (FDMA) and the edge of
the surface corresponds to the sufficient condition in (21). It
can be seen that the Nash equilibrium (uncertainty, ǫ = 0)
moves closer to the Pareto optimal solution as the interference
increases. It is also evident that the sum-rate increases for a
fixed interference as uncertainty increases, as expected from
Theorem 2. In Figure 2b, we can see the sum-rate at low
interference as a function of interference and uncertainty.
As expected from Theorem 2, the sum-rate decreases as the
uncertainty increases.
In Figures 3–10, the behaviour of the equilibrium under
varying uncertainty bounds is investigated through numerical
simulations. The simulations are computed for a system with
Q users and N frequencies averaged over 5000 channel
realizations. The channel gains are Hrq(k) ∼ NC(0, 1) for
r 6= q and Hqq(k) ∼ NC(0, 2.25). The channel uncertainty
model has nominal value Frq(k) = F truerq (k)(1 + erq(k)) with
erq(k) ∼ U(−
δ
2 ,
δ
2 ), δ < 1. The specific parameter values
used for the simulations are provided above each figure. Note
that the zero uncertainty solution corresponds to the Nash
equilibrium and the nominal solution is the solution resulting
from using the erroneous channel values in the traditional rate-
maximization game G S without accounting for its uncertainty.
The effect of uncertainty, number of users and number of
frequencies on the average sum-rate of the system, the average
number of frequencies occupied by each user and the average
number of iterations for convergence are examined. In these
figures, the Nash equilibrium point is when the uncertainty is
zero.
In Figure 3, it can be observed that the sum-rate at the
Nash equilibrium under perfect CSI is less than the sum-rate
at the robust-optimization equilibrium under imperfect CSI
and that the gap in performance increases as the uncertainty δ
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Fig. 2: Simulation results for the anti-symmetric system in
Figure 1. Note that the zero uncertainty corresponds to the
Nash equilibrium
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Fig. 3: Sum-rate of the system vs. uncertainty δ.
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Fig. 4: Sum-rate of the system vs. number of users, Q.
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Fig. 5: Sum-rate of the system vs. number of frequencies, N .
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Fig. 6: Average number of channels occupied per user vs.
uncertainty, δ.
2 3 4 5 6 7
7
8
9
10
11
12
δ=0.5, N=16
Number of users
Av
er
ag
e 
no
. o
f f
re
q.
/u
se
r
 
 
Nominal solution
Robust solution
Fig. 7: Average number of channels occupied per user vs.
number of users, Q.
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Fig. 8: Average number of iterations vs. uncertainty, δ.
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Fig. 9: Average number of iterations vs. number of users, Q.
increases. Under imperfect CSI, the power allocation using the
robust-optimization equilibrium3 in (16) and (17) has higher
sum-rate as uncertainty increases, because the users are more
cautious about using frequencies with significant interference,
thus reducing the total amount of interference in the system.
The Pareto optimal solution in this scenario is some form of
FDMA (where the specific channels allocated to a particular
user will depend on the actual channel gains), and does not
depend on the channel uncertainty bound for a given system
realization. Thus, when the sum-rate of the system increases
with rise in uncertainty, we can expect that the price of anarchy
will decrease.
In Figure 4, it can be observed that the sum-rate of the
system under the robust solution reduces when the number of
users increases. This is because having a greater number of
users results in higher interference for all users and this effect
is strong enough to counter user diversity which would have
resulted in higher sum-rates if the users were on an FDMA
scheme. In Figure 5, it can be observed that the sum-rate of the
system improves with increase in number of frequencies and
also that the robust solution continues to perform better than
the nominal solution even when the number of frequencies
increases.
In Figure 6, it can be seen that the robust solution results
in a lower average number of channels per user as the
uncertainty, δ increases. Also, the total number of channels
3(16) and (17) are in terms of absolute uncertainty ǫ while the simulations
use relative uncertainty δ. They are equivalent to one another.
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Fig. 10: Average number of iterations vs. number of frequen-
cies, N .
each user occupies at the robust-optimization equilibrium is
lesser than at the nominal solution, regardless of the number
of users, as can be seen in Figure 7. This implies that the
users are employing a smaller number of frequencies, which
demonstrates the improved partitioning of the frequency space
among the users in order to reduce interference. Hence, this
leads to the higher sum-rates as observed in Figure 3.
In Figures 8 and 9, it can be observed that the average
number of iterations for convergence increases as the uncer-
tainty δ, and the number of users Q increase respectively.
This is as expected from Lemma 3 and Corollary 1, as the
modulus of the block-contraction in (39) increases as the
uncertainty increases. This indicates that the step size of
each iteration reduces as uncertainty increases, leading to
slower convergence. In Figure 10, it can be observed that
the average number of iterations increases with the number
of frequencies. This is due to the fact that when there are
more frequencies, and as such there is a greater probability
of a channel realization being drawn from the tail of the
Gaussian distribution used to generate them, which results in a
smaller modulus of the block-contraction in (39) on average, a
greater number of iterations are required in order to converge
to the equilibrium. Thus, the trade-off for robust solutions with
higher sum-rates is in a higher number of iterations before
convergence.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have presented a novel approach for rate-
maximization games under bounded channel state information
uncertainty. We have introduced a distribution-free robust for-
mulation for the rate-maximization game. The solution to this
game has been shown to be a modified waterfilling operation.
The robust-optimization equilibrium (RE) for this game has
been presented and sufficient conditions for its existence,
uniqueness and asymptotic convergence of the algorithm to
the RE have been derived. For the two-user case, the effect
of uncertainty on the social output of the system has been
analyzed. We analytically prove that the RE moves towards
an FDMA solution as the uncertainty bound increases, when
the number of frequencies in the system becomes asymptot-
ically large. Thus, an interesting effect of improvement in
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sum-rate as the uncertainty bound increases is observed. In
summary, for systems with significant interference, bounded
channel uncertainty leads to an improved sum-rate but at the
cost of greater number of iterations. This framework can be
extended to MIMO rate-maximization games, cognitive radio
with various interference constraints and other noncooperative
games.
APPENDIX
A. Robust Waterfilling as a Projection Operation
Let Φq(k) represent the denominator terms in (14), which
is the worst-case noise+interference
Φq(k) , σ
2
q(k) +
∑
r 6=q
Frq(k)pr(k) + ǫq
√∑
r 6=q
p2r(k). (28)
It has been shown in [33] that the waterfilling operation
can be interpreted as the Euclidean projection of a vector
onto a simplex. Using this framework, the robust waterfilling
operator in (16) can be expressed as the Euclidean projection
of the vector Φq , [Φq(1), . . . ,Φq(N)]T onto the simplex Pq
defined in (9):
RWFq(p−q) =
[
−Φq
]
Pq
, (29)
which can be conveniently written as
RWFq(p−q) =
[
− σq −
∑
r 6=q
Frqpr − ǫqfq
]
Pq
, (30)
where
σq ,
[
σ2q (1), . . . , σ
2
q(N)
]T
, (31)
Frq , Diag
(
Frq(1), . . . , Frq(N)
)
, (32)
fq ,
[√∑
r 6=q p
2
r(1) , . . . ,
√∑
r 6=q p
2
r(N)
]T
. (33)
B. Contraction Property of the Waterfilling Projection
Given the waterfilling mapping RWF(·) defined as
RWF(p) = (RWFq(p−q))q∈Ω : P 7→ P , (34)
where P , P1 × · · · × PQ, with Pq and RWFq(p−q)
respectively defined in (9) and (30), the block-maximum norm
is defined as [34]∣∣∣∣RWF(p)∣∣∣∣w
2,block
, max
q∈Ω
∣∣∣∣RWFq(pq)∣∣∣∣2
wq
, (35)
where w , [w1, . . . , wQ]T > 0 is any positive weight vector.
The vector weighted maximum norm is given by [32]
||x||w∞,vec , max
q∈Ω
|xq|
wq
, w > 0, x ∈ RQ (36)
The matrix weighted maximum norm is given by [32]
||A||w∞,mat , max
q
1
wq
Q∑
r=1
|[A]qr |wr, A ∈ R
Q×Q. (37)
The mapping RWF(·) is said to be a block-contraction4
with modulus α with respect to the norm
∣∣∣∣ · ∣∣∣∣w
2,block
if there
exists α ∈ [0, 1) such that, ∀p(1),p(2) ∈ P ,∣∣∣∣RWF(p(1))−RWF(p(2))∣∣∣∣w
2,block
≤ α
∣∣∣∣p(1)−p(2)∣∣∣∣w
2,block
,
(38)
where p(i) =
(
p
(i)
q , . . . ,p
(i)
q
)
for i = 1, 2.
The contraction property of the waterfilling mapping is
given by the following lemma:
Lemma 3. Given w , [w1, . . . , wQ]T > 0, the mapping
RWF(·) defined in (34) satisfies∣∣∣∣RWF (p(1))− RWF (p(2))∣∣∣∣w
2,block
≤
||Smax +E||w∞,mat ×
∣∣∣∣p(1) − p(2)∣∣∣∣w
2,block
,
(39)
∀p(1),p(2) ∈ P , where E and S as defined in (19) and (20)
respectively. Furthermore, if
||Smax +E||w∞,mat < 1, (40)
for some w > 0, then the mapping RWF(·) is a block
contraction with modulus α = ||Smax +E||w∞,mat.
Proof: This proof is structured similar to that of [33,
Proposition 2]. However the additional term ǫqfq in (30)
necessitates a separate treatment here.
For each q ∈ Ω and i = 1, 2, given f (i)q =[√∑
r 6=q p
2
r(1)
(i), . . . ,
√∑
r 6=q p
2
r(N)
(i)
]T
, let p−q(k)(i) ,
[p1(k)
(i), . . . , pq−1(k)
(i), pq+1(k)
(i), . . . , pQ(k)
(i)] and
∆fq ,
∣∣∣∣f (1)q − f (2)q ∣∣∣∣2. Then,
∆fq =
 N∑
k=1
√∑
r 6=q
p2r(k)
(1) −
√∑
r 6=q
p2r(k)
(2)
2

1
2
(41)
=
[
N∑
k=1
(∣∣∣∣p−q(k)(1)∣∣∣∣2 − ∣∣∣∣p−q(k)(2)∣∣∣∣2)2
] 1
2
(42)
≤
[
N∑
k=1
∣∣∣∣∣∣p−q(k)(1) − p−q(k)(2)∣∣∣∣∣∣2
2
] 1
2
(43)
=
[
N∑
k=1
∑
r 6=q
(
p2r(k)
(1) + p2r(k)
(2)
−2pr(k)
(1)pr(k)
(2)
)] 12
(44)
=
[∑
r 6=q
∣∣∣∣∣∣p(1)r − p(2)r ∣∣∣∣∣∣2
2
] 1
2
. (45)
where (43) follows from [32, Lemma 5.1.2]. Now, define for
each q ∈ Ω,
eRWFq ,
∣∣∣∣∣∣RWFq (p(1)−q)− RWFq (p(2)−q)∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
eq ,
∣∣∣∣∣∣p(1)q − p(2)q ∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
.
(46)
4The mapping T is called a block-contraction with modulus α ∈ [0, 1) if
it is a contraction in the block-maximum norm with modulus α [34].
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Then, using (30) in (46), eRWFq can be written as
eRWFq =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣[− σq −∑
r 6=q
Frqp
(1)
r − ǫqf
(1)
q
]
Pq
−
[
− σq −
∑
r 6=q
Frqp
(2)
r − ǫqf
(2)
q
]
Pq
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
(47)
≤
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∑
r 6=q
Frqp
(1)
r + ǫqf
(1)
q
−
∑
r 6=q
Frqp
(2)
r − ǫqf
(2)
q
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
(48)
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∑
r 6=q
Frq
(
p(1)r − p
(2)
r
)
+ ǫq
(
f (1)q − f
(2)
q
)∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
(49)
≤
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∑
r 6=q
Frq
(
p(1)r − p
(2)
r
)∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
+ ǫq
∣∣∣∣∣∣f (1)q − f (2)q ∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
(50)
≤
∣∣∣∣∣∣∑
r 6=q
Frq
(
p(1)r − p
(2)
r
) ∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
+ ǫq
[∑
r 6=q
∣∣∣∣∣∣p(1)r − p(2)r ∣∣∣∣∣∣2
2
] 1
2
(51)
≤
∑
r 6=q
(
max
k
Frq(k)
)∣∣∣∣∣∣p(1)r − p(2)r ∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
+ ǫq
[∑
r 6=q
∣∣∣∣∣∣p(1)r − p(2)r ∣∣∣∣∣∣2
2
] 1
2
(52)
=
∑
r 6=q
(
max
k∈Dq∩Dr
Frq(k)
)
er + ǫq
[∑
r 6=q
e2r
] 1
2 (53)
≤
∑
r 6=q
(
[Smax]rq + ǫq
)
er (54)
∀ p
(1)
q ,p
(2)
q ∈ Pq and ∀ q ∈ Ω, where: (48) follows from
the nonexpansive property of the waterfilling projection [33,
Lemma 3]; (50) follows from the triangle inequality [32]; (51)
follows from (45); (52) and (53) follow from the definitions of
Frq and eq respectively from (31) and (46); and (54) follows
from the definition of Smax in (20) and Jensen’s inequality
[27].
The set of inequalities in (54) can be written in vector form
as
0 ≤ eRWF ≤ (S
max +E)e (55)
where E is defined in (19) and the vectors eRWF and e
are defined as eRWF ,
[
eRWF1 , . . . , eRWFQ
]T
, and e =
[e1. . . . , eQ]
T
. Using the vector and matrix weighted maximum
norms from (36) and (37) respectively, (55) can be written as∣∣∣∣eRWF∣∣∣∣w∞,vec ≤ ∣∣∣∣(Smax +E)e∣∣∣∣w∞,vec
≤
∣∣∣∣Smax +E∣∣∣∣w
∞,mat
·
∣∣∣∣e∣∣∣∣w
∞,vec
,
(56)
∀ w > 0. Using the block-maximum norm (35), we get∣∣∣∣RWF (p(1))− RWF (p(2))∣∣∣∣w
2,block
=
∣∣∣∣eRWF∣∣∣∣w∞,vec
≤
∣∣∣∣Smax +E∣∣∣∣w
∞,mat
∣∣∣∣∣∣p(1)r − p(2)r ∣∣∣∣∣∣w
2,block
(57)
∀p(2),p(2) ∈ P , with E and S as defined in (19) and (20)
respectively. It is clear that RWF(·) is a block contraction
when ||Smax +E||w∞,mat < 1.
C. Proof of Theorem 1
From [35], every concave game5 has at least one equilib-
rium. For the game G rob:
1) The set of feasible strategy profiles, Pq of each player
q is compact and convex.
2) The payoff function of each player q in (13) is contin-
uous in p ∈ P and concave in pq ∈ Pq .
Thus, the game G rob has at least one robust equilibrium.
From Lemma 3, the waterfilling mapping RWF(·) is a
block-contraction if (40) is satisfied for some w > 0. Thus,
the RE of game G rob is unique (using [36, Theorem 1]). Since
Smax+E is a nonnegative matrix, there exists a positive vector
w¯ such that
||Smax +E||w¯∞,mat < 1 (58)
Using [34, Corollary 6.1] and the triangle inequality [32], this
is satisfied when
||Smax||w¯∞,mat + ||E||
w¯
∞,mat < 1 ⇒ ρ(S
max) < 1− ρ(E).
(59)
From Lemma 3 and (58) the waterfilling mapping RWF(·)
is a block-contraction. From [36, Theorem 2], the robust itera-
tive waterfilling algorithm described in Algorithm 1 converges
to the unique RE of game G rob for any set of feasible initial
conditions and any update schedule.
D. Proof of Theorem 2
Consider the interior operating points of the robust waterfill-
ing operator RWFq(·) where it is linear. Eliminating µ from
(23), we get
p =
1− α− ǫ
2(1− (m+ 1)α/2− ǫ)
≥ 0.5. (60)
The signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) for the
two users in the two frequency bins is given by
SINR1(1) = SINR2(2) =
p
σ2 + α(1− p)
SINR1(2) = SINR2(1) =
1− p
σ2 +mαp
.
(61)
and the sum-rate of the system at the RE is
Srob , 2 log
(
1 +
p
σ2 + α(1 − p)
)
+ 2 log
(
1 +
1− p
σ2 +mαp
)
(62)
The gradient of p with respect to ǫ is
∂ p
∂ ǫ
=
(m− 1)α
4(1− (m+ 1)α/2− ǫ)2
> 0. (63)
Thus, the RE moves towards the FDMA solution as the
uncertainty bound increases.
5A game is said to be concave if the payoff functions are concave and the
sets of admissible strategies are compact and convex.
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Case 1: High interference scenario: In the high interference
scenario, σ2 ≪ α(1 − p). Let ξ = p/α(1 − p). Then, the
SINR for the two users in the two frequency bins can be
approximated as
SINR1(1) = SINR2(2) ≈
p
α(1− p)
= ξ ,
SINR1(2) = SINR2(1) ≈
1− p
mαp
=
1
mα2ξ
.
(64)
The sum-rate of the system at high interference can be
approximated as
S ≈ 2 log
(
(1 + ξ)(1 +
1
mα2ξ
)
)
= 2 log
(
1 +
1
mα2
+ ξ +
1
mα2ξ
)
.
(65)
Our aim is to analyse the behaviour of the sum-rate S as
the uncertainty ǫ increases. To this end, we show that the
gradient of the sum-rate with respect to ǫ is positive. As log(x)
increases monotonically with x, we consider
∂
∂ ǫ
(ξ +
1
mα2ξ
) = (1 −
1
mα2ξ2
)
∂ ξ
∂ ǫ
=
(
1−
(1− p)2
mp2
)∂ ξ
∂ ǫ
,
(66)
and (1− (1−p)
2
mp2
) > 0 since p ≥ 0.5 and m > 1. Now,
∂ ξ
∂ ǫ
=
1
α(1 − p)2
∂ p
∂ ǫ
. (67)
From (63), (66) and (67), we get ∂ S
∂ ǫ
> 0. Thus, we see
that the sum-rate of the system increases as the uncertainty
ǫ increases. This also shows that the robust-optimization
equilibrium achieves a higher sum-rate in the presence of
channel uncertainty (ǫ > 0) than the Nash equilibrium at zero
uncertainty (ǫ = 0).
The social optimal solution for this system at high interfer-
ence is frequency division multiplexing [21]. In other words,
the frequency space is fully partitioned at the social optimal
solution. The sum-rate at the social optimal solution for the
given system at high interference, S∗, is given by
S∗ = 2 log
(
1 +
1
σ2
)
. (68)
The price of anarchy at high interference, PoA, is
PoA =
log
(
1 + 1
σ2
)
log
(
1 + 1
mα2
+ ξ + 1
mα2ξ
) . (69)
Since ∂ S
∂ ǫ
> 0, we have ∂ PoA
∂ ǫ
< 0.
Case 2: Low interference scenario: In the low inter-
ference scenario, i.e. when mαp ≪ σ2, the signal-to-
interference+noise ratio SINR for the two users in the two
frequency bins can be approximately written as
SINR1(1) = SINR2(2) ≈
p
σ2
,
SINR1(2) = SINR2(1) ≈
1− p
σ2
.
(70)
The sum-rate of the system at low interference can be approx-
imated as
S ≈ 2 log
(
(1 +
p
σ2
)(1 +
1− p
σ2
)
)
= 2 log
(
1 +
1
σ2
+
p− p2
σ2
)
.
(71)
Now,
∂ S
∂ ǫ
=
(
1 +
1
σ2
+
p− p2
σ2
)−1 (1− 2p)
σ2
∂ p
∂ ǫ
< 0. (72)
At low interference, the system behaves similar to a parallel
Gaussian channel system. The social optimal solution in this
scenario is the classical waterfilling solution and leads to equal
power allocation, i.e., p1(1) = p1(2) = p2(1) = p2(2) = p =
0.5. The sum-rate at the social optimal solution for the given
system at low interference, S∗, is given by
S∗ = 4 log
(
1 +
1
2σ2
)
. (73)
The price of anarchy at low interference, PoA, is
PoA =
4 log
(
1 + 12σ2
)
2 log
(
1 + 1
σ2
+ p−p
2
σ2
)
=
log
(
1 + 1
σ2
+ 14σ4
)
log
(
1 + 1
σ2
+ p−p
2
σ2
) . (74)
Note that, at low interference, mαp ≪ 1. From (60), we
get p ≈ 0.5. Thus the PoA is close to unity. Since ∂ S
∂ ǫ
< 0,
we have ∂ PoA
∂ ǫ
> 0.
E. Proof of Proposition 1
The gradient of the sum-rate Srob with respect to ǫ is
∂ Srob
∂ ǫ
=
∂ Srob
∂ p
∂ p
∂ ǫ
. (75)
From (63), we have ∂ p
∂ ǫ
> 0. Now,
∂ Srob
∂ p
= 2
1
σ2+α(1−p) +
αp
(σ2+α(1−p))2
1 + p
σ2+α(1−p)
− 2
1
σ2+mαp +
(1−p)mα
(σ2+mαp)2
1 + 1−p
σ2+mαp
.
(76)
Setting ∂ Srob
∂ p
= 0, we solve for α to get the following roots,
α =

0,
−σ2
2m
(
m+ 1±
(
4m/σ2 + (m+ 1)2
) 1
2
)
,
σ2(2p−1)
(m−1)p2+2p−1 .
(77)
The positive root that is independent of ǫ and p (which is a
function of the uncertainty ǫ, from (60)) is the required solu-
tion where the sum-rate is constant regardless of uncertainty.
Thus, the required interference value is given by
αo =
σ2
2m
((
4m/σ2 + (m+ 1)2
) 1
2 −m− 1
)
. (78)
Since the root αo of ∂ Srob∂ p is independent of p, different power
allocation schemes (resulting in different values of p) will
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result in the same sum-rate at α = αo. Thus, the price of
anarchy at α = αo is unity.
F. Proof of Lemma 2
From (16), the power allocations for the two users at the
robust-optimization equilibrium in the k-th frequency are
p1(k) =
(
µ1 − σ
2 − (F21 + ǫ)p2(k)
)+
,
p2(k) =
(
µ2 − σ
2 − (F12 + ǫ)p1(k)
)+
,
(79)
with
∑N
k=1 p1(k) =
∑N
k=1 p2(k) = PT .
Let D1,D2 and Dol be the sets of frequencies exclusively
used by user 1, user 2 and by both respectively and n1 , |D1|
and n2 , |D2| be the number of frequencies exclusively used
by user 1 and user 2 respectively at the equilibrium. Then,
from (79), we have p1(k) = µ1 − σ21 and p2(k) = 0 ∀ k ∈
D1 and p1(k) = 0 and p2(k) = µ2 − σ21 ∀ k ∈ D2. The
power remaining for allocation to the frequencies in Dol ,
{k1, . . . , kol} by user 1 and user 2 is (1−n1µ1) and (1−n2µ2)
respectively.
This separation of the frequency-space into exclusive-use
and overlapped-use frequencies allows us to analyse the sys-
tem without the nonlinear operation (·)+. Thus, we can write
the power allocations at the fixed point in the overlapped-use
frequency-space as a system of linear equations,
p1(k) +
(
F21(k) + ǫ
)
p2(k)− µ1 − σ
2 = 0, k ∈ Dol (80)(
F12(k) + ǫ
)
p1(k) + p2(k)− µ2 − σ
2 = 0, k ∈ Dol (81)∑
k∈Dol
p1(k) + n1(µ1 − σ2) = PT , (82)∑
k∈Dol
p2(k) + n2(µ2 − σ2) = PT . (83)
Writing these in matrix form we get,
Ak1 0 −I2
.
.
.
.
.
.
0 Akol −I2
I2 · · · I2 D


p(k1)
.
.
.
p(kol)
µ
 =

02
.
.
.
02
pt
 (84)
where
Ak ,
[
1 F21(k) + ǫ
F12(k) + ǫ 1
]
, D ,
[
n1 0
0 n2
]
,
p(k) ,
[
p1(k)
p2(k)
]
, pt ,
[
PT
PT
]
µ ,
[
µ1 − σ2
µ2 − σ2
]
.
(85)
Let
A ,
Ak1 0. .
.
0 Akol
 , B ,
−I2..
.
−I2
 ,
C ,
[
I2 . . . I2
]
and P ,
[
p(k1) . . .p(kol)
]T
.
(86)
so that we can write (84) as[
A B
C D
] [
P
µ
]
=
[
0
pt
]
. (87)
We can solve this system to get[
P
µ
]
=
[
A B
C D
]−1 [
0
pt
]
=
[
W X
Y Z
] [
0
pt
]
=
[
Xpt
Zpt
]
, (88)
where [
W X
Y Z
]
,
[
A B
C D
]−1
. (89)
Using [37, Fact 10.12.9] and differentiating (88) with respect
to ǫ, we get
∂
∂ǫ
[
P
µ
]
= −
[
A B
C D
]−1[ ∂
∂ǫ
A 0
0 0
] [
A B
C D
]−1[
0
pt
]
(90)
= −
[
W( ∂
∂ǫ
A)Xpt
Y( ∂
∂ǫ
A)Xpt
]
. (91)
Due to the nature of the waterfilling function, n1 and n2
are non-decreasing piecewise-constant functions of ǫ. The
above derivative exists only in the regions where n1 and
n2 are constant. From [37, Proposition 2.8.7] and using
A−1 = Diag(A−1k1 , . . . ,A
−1
kol
), we get
W =
A
−1
k1
−A−1k1 ZA
−1
k1
· · · −A−1k1 ZA
−1
kol
.
.
.
.
.
.
−A−1kolZA
−1
k1
· · · A−1kol −A
−1
kol
ZA−1kol
 ,(92)
X =
[
A−1k1 Z . . . A
−1
kol
Z
]T
, (93)
Y = −
[
ZA−1k1 · · · ZA
−1
kol
]
, (94)
Z =
1
∆̂

n2 +
∑
k∈Dol
1
∆i
∑
k∈Dol
F21(i) + ǫ
∆i∑
k∈Dol
F12(i) + ǫ
∆i
n1 +
∑
k∈Dol
1
∆i
 , (95)
where ∆i , det(Ai) = 1−
(
F21(i) + ǫ
)(
F12(i) + ǫ
)
,
∆̂ ,
(
n1 +
∑
k∈Dol
1
∆i
)(
n2 +
∑
k∈Dol
1
∆i
)
−
(∑
k∈Dol
F21(i)+ǫ
∆i
)(∑
k∈Dol
F12(i)+ǫ
∆i
)
,
(96)
and
A−1i =
[
1
∆i
−F21(i)+ǫ∆i
−F12(i)+ǫ∆i
1
∆i
]
. (97)
Thus, from (88) and (91), we get
P = Xpt =
[
A−1k1 Zpt . . . A
−1
kol
Zpt
]T
, (98)
and
∂P
∂ ǫ
= −W(
∂A
∂ ǫ
)X, (99)
=

kol∑
i=k1
A−1k1 ZA
−1
i GA
−1
i Zpt −A
−1
k1
GA−1k1 Zpt
.
.
.
kol∑
i=k1
A−1kolZA
−1
i GA
−1
i Zpt −A
−1
kol
GA−1kolZpt

(100)
where
G =
∂Ai
∂ ǫ
=
[
0 1
1 0
]
∀ i = 1, . . . , N. (101)
Therefore, for k = k1, . . . , kol,
p(k) =
[
p1(k) p2(k)
]T
= A−1k Zpt, (102)
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p′(k) =
∂
∂ǫ
p(k) =
[
p′1(k) p
′
2(k)
]T (103)
= A−1k Z
kol∑
i=k1
A−1i GA
−1
i Zpt
−A−1k GA
−1
k Zpt (104)
Consider the extent of partitioning J(k) at any frequency k.
For frequencies where J(k) = 0, at least one of the users has
zero power allocation and that will not change with change in
uncertainty. Thus ∂
∂ǫ
J(k) = 0 for k ∈ D1∪D2. Also, in cases
when n1 or n2 change due to some frequency k¯ dropping from
the set Dol, J(k¯) increases from some negative value to zero.
Now consider the extent of partitioning for frequencies
where both users have non-zero power allocation. Differen-
tiating the extent of partitioning for frequency k ∈ Dol with
respect to ǫ, we get
∂
∂ǫ
J(k) =
∂
∂ǫ
(−p1(k)p2(k)) (105)
= −p′1(k)p2(k) + p1(k)p
′
2(k) (106)
= −p(k)TGp′(k) (107)
= −
(
A−1k Zpt
)T
G
(
−A−1k GA
−1
k Zpt
+A−1k Z
kol∑
i=k1
A−1i GA
−1
i Zpt
)
(108)
= pt
TZTA−1k
T
GA−1k
(
I
−Z
kol∑
i=k1
A−1i GA
−1
i G
−1Ak
)
GA−1k Zpt
(109)
Let qk , GA−1k Zpt. Using GT = G−1 = G, GA
−1
i G =
A−Ti and GAkG = ATk we get
∂
∂ǫ
J(k) = qTk
(
A−1k −A
−1
k Z
kol∑
i=k1
A−1i A
−T
i A
T
k
)
qk (110)
Let Mk =
∑kol
i=k1
A−1i A
−T
i A
T
k and Qk = A
−1
k −A
−1
k ZMk.
When nol = o(N) (i.e., when limN→∞ nolN = 0), we
have the total number of frequencies, n1 + n2 = O(N).
Since A−1i A
−T
i A
T
k = O(1) for each i and k, we have
Mk = O(nol) and Z = O(1/N). Thus,
lim
N→∞
A−1k ZMk = 0
⇒ lim
N→∞
Qk +Q
T
k = A
−1
k +A
−T
k ≻ 0
(111)
from Theorem 1. Thus we get xTQkx > 0 ∀x ∈ R2×1 as its
symmetric part Qk +QTk is positive definite [38]. Hence, we
get ∂
∂ǫ
J(k) ≥ 0 when N → ∞, with equality when J(k) =
0.
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